industrial SMEs and households, leading to the birth and first steps of the Barzón movement in 1993-94. The fourth section accounts for the explosion of the debtors' movements since 1995, while the last deals with its successes and failures in defending its membership.
Structural reforms in Mexico: main characteristics and political economy
Mexico's main liberalising reforms were launched in 1988 during the last year of the De la Madrid administration and they were pursued 'aggressively' by the new government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who took office at the end of the year. Structural reforms were coupled with a new stabilisation program that had been introduced earlier, in December 1987, in order to attack a threatening inflationary economy.
Although the previous stabilisation policies (applied since December 1982) 1 succeeded in restoring the current account balance and Mexico's capacity to serve a restructured external debt, they failed to achieve fiscal balance and price stability. steady growth didn't resume after the 1983 recession, living standards plunged, and the income distribution disparity worsened. As part of the effort to balance the federal budget, public investment in physical infrastructure and human capital sank while private investment remained at a low level; obsolescence became widespread among the industrial sector.
Some structural reforms were sketched out during the 1982-1987 period; a few minor privatisation operations were carried out successfully, but, above all, the authorities took several important steps towards trade liberalisation. In 1983 they introduced the program aimed at developing in-bond maquiladora (assembly plant) industries, while in 1985, some of the non-tariff barriers implemented in 1981-82 were lifted, and higher-range tariffs were lowered. Finally, in 1986, Mexico became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These measures did not appear to have stimulated the adjustment and modernisation of domestic tradable sectors; on one hand, an undervalued peso protected them from foreign competition, while on the other, the gloomy perspectives of the domestic economy, combined with the credit crunch suffered by the private sector, further dissuaded
Mexican entrepreneurs from undertaking new productive investment.
In the financial realm, the nationalisation of the banking system was not wholly reverted, 2 but all the subsidiaries of the banks, and especially their market arms, the brokerage houses, were returned to the private sector. This measure, combined with the monetarist reform of public sector financing, 3 caused extensive change in the composition of the financial sector.
On one side, financial repression limited the development of banks, which were dedicated mainly to satisfying public sector financial needs; on the other, as the government relied increasingly on market financing, this same deficit fostered the development of money market securities and private market intermediaries. Furthermore, this measure has had important consequences for the relationship between the government and the leading sectors of Mexican big business. As a matter of fact, the main initial purpose of the privatisation brokerages was a political one, since it was aimed at restoring this sector's confidence, a high priority goal for President de la Madrid. Its relations with government had been deteriorating since the early 1970s. Mexico's entrepreneurs disliked the populist rhetoric of Presidents Echeverría (1970-76) and López Portillo (1976 Portillo ( -1982 , as well as the increasing participation of the public sector in productive activities. The conflict became more acute in the late seventies, when it provoked increasing capital flight, and it culminated in 1982 with the nationalisation of the banking sector. This last measure led to further criticism of government authoritarianism, and to demands to put an end to the PRI's hegemony and to democratise the political structure (Kessler 1999, 52) . Thus, the brokerages' privatisation, combined with a public restructuring program for corporate foreign debt, 'helped the ruling party regain its credibility among Mexico's economic elite' (55).
Whatever its success in winning back the confidence of Mexico's big business, the administration was unable to regain support from the popular and middle classes, nor from medium and small businesses as well. increasing support from the urban and rural poor. Moreover, 'public outrage, repeated denunciations from opposition parties, and increased international exposure put the PRI leadership on notice that future electoral victories-at least at the national level-would have to be legitimate' (Kessler 1999, 84) . As economic failure appeared to be the main explanation for the PRI's electoral vulnerability, the Salinas administration deemed it had just six years to achieve economic recovery and growth in order to secure a fair victory for the ruling party in 1994. These social and political circumstances certainly explain partially the speed and the sequence of the structural reforms that were introduced between 1988 and 1992. Indeed, the characteristics adopted by these policies can be explained either in these terms or on economic grounds.
The new 'heterodox' stabilisation package had been implemented in December 1987. It was based on a diagnostic that dismissed excess domestic demand as a cause for the increasing level of inflation; instead, it explained it in terms of inflation inertia. 5 This program's key mechanism, the so-called 'Pacto' (Pact for Economic Solidarity), was established as a tripartite agreement between the government and the representatives of labour and business, reflecting the particular political structure of the country. Its main features combined a pegging of the exchange rate to the U.S. dollar, a temporal freeze of wages, private and public sector prices, and further fiscal adjustment. In 1988, the initial fixed exchange rate was replaced by decreasing daily devaluations of the nominal rate of the peso, while prices and wages were adjusted in line with projected inflation. The mechanics of the program were maintained throughout the whole Salinas administration;
and, adjustments were agreed in tripartite bargaining every December. The program succeeded in stopping inflation quickly. In turn, this success was instrumental in achieving fiscal balance. 6 However, the peg created a real appreciation of the peso that was not reversed, and in 1994, the Mexican currency was severely overvalued. As a consequence, since 1988 Mexico has posted increasing current account deficits that threaten the viability of the program. As we shall see, the features of this program, coupled with a specific combination of structural reforms, have also been harmful for Mexico's tradable sectors, and particularly for small and medium enterprises.
Since they were initially designed to support the adjustment process, some of these structural policies, especially fiscal reform and trade liberalisation, had already been launched in 1987 . Fiscal reform (1987 helped to strengthen federal revenues and to diminish their reliance on oil revenues. Trade liberalisation was accelerated in December 1987; tariffs were lowered as was their dispersion, and import licenses were mostly removed. This policy sought to discipline domestic producers, as increased foreign competition would induce them to moderate price adjustment. The Salinas administration intensified these policies and broadened the scope of liberalisation. For analytical purposes, the measures can be classified into two broad groups: those aimed at reducing the direct intervention of the Mexican government in economic matters; and those which were intended to re-establish the country's access to international finance. In the first group, we can list the elimination of subsidies to production and consumption and the end of industrial policy, the deregulation of some key domestic sectors, like telecommunications or transport, the privatisation of big state-owned enterprises (SOEs) between 1989 and 1992, and the liberalisation of the domestic financial system . In the second group, the main measures were the signing of a Brady Plan agreement , and the opening of the capital account of the balance of payments .
In a few words, speed and simultaneity of adjustments characterised these reforms, which were classified by the World Bank as 'shock therapy,' since the main measures had been introduced in less than two years. Such a pace of reform had been made possible by the high degree of autonomy traditionally enjoyed by the Mexican president. 7 It has been motivated on political grounds by the need to regain support for the ruling party through economic success, and, on the economic side, by the intention to give strong signals, so as to attract the foreign funding needed to pursue the stabilisation package. Together, these policies, and especially the Brady agreement, the privatisations of big SOEs, and the opening of domestic securities markets to foreign investment (domestic public debt and equity markets), allowed Mexico to receive the inflows it urgently required. 8 Thus, structural, long-term reforms were used as instruments in supporting the short-term stabilisation process.
As expected, these policies had dissimilar effects on the various social and productive sectors. A dichotomy of winners and losers would put Mexican big business, the upper and middle classes and non tradable sectors within the first category, and producers of the tradable sectors, and especially small and medium enterprises, and the urban and rural poor as well, within the second. Mexican big business has clearly been the major beneficiary of structural reforms. It has been favoured by the privatisation process, which strengthened it greatly while reinforcing its ties with the ruling party as well as its capacity to influence economic decision making. Moreover, financial liberalisation, which facilitated its access to foreign markets, combined with the currency appreciation, enabled it to finance its modernisation in a cheaper way.
As a matter of fact, industrial sectors that succeeded in adapting to the new environment, 7 In fact, Carlos Salinas was the last Mexican president to enjoy such autonomy. However, as we shall see, credit was extremely expensive, and its expansion would prove unsustainable, leading to the incorporation of urban consumers in the debtors' movements.
Tradable labour-intensive sectors where small and medium enterprises predominate were clearly the losers of the adjustment process. When trade began, they were already at a disadvantage, since inefficiencies and obsolescence were widespread in the heavily protected Mexican industry and in the undercapitalized rural sector as well. In these conditions, they were exposed simultaneously to trade liberalisation, whose effects were compounded by the currency real appreciation, and to the withdrawal of state supportsubsidies and industrial policy programs were removed early. Moreover, access to credit was restricted to a small fraction of these enterprises, presumably the more formalised and competitive, and for those who qualified, interest rates were high. As a result, productivity improvements were rather low in those sectors, and some of them, such as the apparel and garment industry and shoe producers, contracted in absolute terms. At a political level, these producers did not succeed in articulating their demands. Their old corporatist body, the Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación (CANACINTRA, National
Chamber of Manufacturing Industries), still heavily controlled by the ruling party, prevented it, and, contrary to the case of big business, no other representation was available or created.
As for the urban and rural poor, reforms did little to enhance their situation directly. On one hand, employment in the formal sector could not increase in the proportion required to absorb the supply of labour, leaving the so-called informal economy or the rural subsistence sector as the only alternatives. In fact lay-offs increased as several labour-intensive tradable sectors were struggling to adapt to the new environment. On the other hand, nominal increases of the minimal wage rate negotiated in the Pactos were consistently lower than the consumer price index (CPI) inflation rate. Although the average real industrial wage regained almost all the purchasing power it had lost since 1982, the lower-end wages, which affected a significant part of the workforce, kept losing real value. 10 However, some segments of these social sectors benefited from the reforms in an indirect way, as they were the recipients of a patronage-type redistribution of revenues. The privatisation of big SOEs, and particularly banks sales, reported important one-time revenues to the central government. These windfalls seem to have been used with two purposes: to reduce the debt service and enhance the relationship of the ruling party with the popular sectors, through new politically oriented income-redistributing programs, like Solidaridad.
In sum, the special features of the stabilisation and structural reforms package produced short-term results that were highly praised abroad, such as an apparently successful stabilisation process, a more market-oriented economy, and a new trade pattern that elections. However, the longer-term costs of this strategy were extremely high, since the goals of modernisation and enhanced competitiveness of a wider range of domestic enterprises were neglected, leading to the dismantlement of whole sectors. Moreover, the deeply rooted problems of poverty, unequal distribution of personal income and wide regional differences worsened. As a result, growth, which had picked up swiftly in 1989-90, became sluggish after 1991, while the current account deficit kept growing and external finance came in an increasingly risky way, as foreign direct investment was replaced by portfolio investment as the first source of funds. This clearly unsustainable path was broken soon after the new government of Ernesto Zedillo took office, in December 1994. The results I have just mentioned were compounded by the dynamics of bank liberalisation.
Combined with the devaluation of the currency, they set off an already menacing banking crisis.
Financial reforms, credit boom and non-performing loans
Conditions in which bank liberalisation and privatisation occurred were designed to make them a highly profitable investment in the short-term so as to maximise the amount of revenues the government could get from this operation. The main features were as follows:
Banks were liberalized first, between 1988 and 1991, and only then privatised, when they were already profitable institutions.
Liberalisation included a thorough reform of bank operations, since directed credit and legal reserve requirements were completely suppressed (in 1989 and 1991) , 11 and interest rates were freed . Furthermore, universal banking was reestablished and financial holdings were authorised. 12 Privatisation also led to the reconstitution of financial-industrial groups.
Barriers to entry in the sector were not lowered, and they effectively prevented the incorporation of new competitors until 1994, when the new NAFTA rules allowed the participation of new domestic and foreign actors. The choice of a lesser level of competition can be explained on economic grounds: on one hand, it would allow the creation of stronger institutions, able to compete internationally, and on the other, it could also help to scale down systemic risk. However, political explanations are perhaps more likely: first, protection would enable the government to strengthen its alliance with financial big business, and second, as it implied future economic rents, protection would raise the expected revenues of the privatisation process, which could later be used to regain support from the poor (Kessler 1999, 94) .
Privatisation affected18 banks; concentration, which has traditionally been high in the Mexican banking sector, allowed the sector to behave like an oligopoly.
Concentration measures reflected the powers of the three bigger intermediaries;
together they controlled more than 50 per cent of assets in 1994.
The public development banking network was extensively restructured. The main reforms consisted in merging and closing down institutions, and in reducing the scope of their activities, which were refocused towards compensating market failures, i.e.
financing viable SMEs that were not granted access to commercial bank credit. In the rural sector, for example, the biggest producers were directed to commercial banks while profitable small and medium farmers qualified for loans of the development bank, Banrural. 13 Direct lending was also scaled down. Funds were to be allocated by commercial banks and development banks would discount these loans. Moreover, interest rates subsidies were suppressed and, since 1988, market rates have been applied.
As a result of the reforms, banks appeared to be a highly productive investment. At the beginning of the 1990s, Mexico was clearly under-banked, and within the context of structural reforms, the growth prospects of the sector seemed excellent. The banks, which had concentrated on government finance throughout the recession, were financially sound.
Furthermore, they had been granted a protected environment with few competitors within the financial system, since non-bank intermediaries had a limited scale and the scope of public development banks had already been reduced during the first years of the reforms.
Banks shares were consequently priced very highly during the privatisation process: on 13 The poorest peasants were to be attended by social programs. 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 -10% This evolution may be explained, on one hand, by the uncompetitive oligopoly structur the banking sphere, promoted by the authorities, which enabled the banks to lower the interest on deposits while increasing lending rates. In fact, with the exception of instruments available to corporations and wealthy individuals, rates paid on a wide rang deposits have consistently produced negative real yields. On the other hand, the ti market, associated with a high demand for loans from households and businesses that had been credit-constrained for more than a decade, put the banks in a strong position in relation to potential borrowers.
Given the high level of nominal Since they belonged to the upper group of producers who had qualified to receive credit, it members were not marginal peasants but small, medium and sometimes big landowners who had tried to modernize their farm and produce for the market. Guadalajara for 52 days. Other demonstrations included the blocking of the international bridge in Ciudad Juárez (Chihuahua), and a protest walk towards Mexico City, durin 19 Cartón de Grammont stresses that the Barzón movement tried to rebuild bargaining channels between producers and the authorities, especially with the Secretaría de Agricultura (SAHR), which used to be the negotiator in the old corporatist system. He argues that these efforts failed because the government refused to intervene in the conflict between producers and the banks. Moreover, the SAHR had been transformed into a technical body, with the balance of power shifting in favour of the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP, secretary of Economy), much more orthodox in matters of economic policy (Cartón de Grammont 1997, 12.) which the leaders were jailed. The official birth of the movement took place on November 7, when the National Confederation of Rural Producers, 'El Barzón,' was created, with participation of delegates representing eight states (Castro Castro 2000, 99) . During this first phase, membership was estimated at 10,000 participants, almost exclusively of farmers (Torres 1997a, 268) . At that time, demonstrating with tractors, threatening the banks with moratorium on their debts, and seeking the presidents' intervention, were the movement's main tactics.
In agreement peso ratio. After the 1997 polls, when the PRI lost its majority in the Congress, the analys of these operations showed that mismanagement, discretionary operations and favouritism had been the rule, and these issues became a political bomb. It also appeared that wealthy individuals and big firms benefited from the rescue package, as their loans were transferred to FOBAPROA and they were not being served.
In this context the debtors' movements exploded b bankers, securing better repayment conditions for borrowers. In August 1995, estimates o the universe of debtors gave an aggregate number of 7,885,217 borrowers, 6,033,955 of whom were credit card holders, 866,218 mortgage borrowers, 26 and 504,927 firms. 75 per cent were small borrowers, with debts lower than 200,000 pesos for mortgages and firms and lower than 5,000 pesos for credit cards (Calva 1997, 31) . As for the debtors' movements, the BU estimated its members at 1 million in May 1996, while the total membership of all movements reached 2 million. We can thus calculate that rough quarter of the borrowers belonged to a debtors' organisation.
After 1995 As the debtors' movement a nationalist, genuinely plural, multisectoral and polyclassist movement,' 27 aimed at 'promoting the organization of agriculture, trade, industrial and services producers, an credit users, to defend their common interests and improve their standards of living statements, the BU stressed the importance of human dignity and the need to restore it: a 27 Boletín el Barzón, cited in (Mestries, 6.) ww.elbarzón.org 28 Barzón Union web site, available: http://w they said, 'we fight to defend outraged dignity.' 29 This is also emphasised in the common statement signed by the Barzón and the EZLN movements: 'Tenemos vergüenza, tenemos dignidad, tenemos valentía y saldremos adelante' ('We have shame, we have dignity, we have courage and we will go ahead'). 30 As neo-liberal policies were considered to be the main cause for the economic debacle suffered by the country and by the debtors, 'defendin the family patrimony, the domestic productive plants, employment and the country's sovereignty' was regarded as a duty. This last assertion reflects the efforts made by the debtors to broaden the scope of their interventions, from purely defensive actions to m proactive and political activities, in which the new economic model was criticised and proposals were made to build an alternative one. Finally, concerning political action, the Barzón abandoned efforts oriented at getting a presidential mediation and switched its attention towards Congress. Befor p mainly on the PRD lists. As representatives, they defended several bills and tried to stop others that would have strengthened the powers of banks. However, it should be pointed out that the political engagement of its leaders were not always accepted by the local b leading them to leave the movement on several occasions. Initiatives in the political spher were not only oriented towards the national level, but concerned also the states.
In sum, the debtors' movements adopted different and innovative tactics in order to attain their goals. They were especially active between 1994 and 1997, when 'the Barz 33 The main examples of these sorts of statements are the Guadalajara Statement, of August 1995, the Agreement for Economic Recovery, Productive Plant Strengthening and Employment, of March 1996, and with more political goals, the common pact 'Pacto de Intocabilidad,' signed with the EZLN movement in July 1996.
captured social grievances in such a way that it is best described as a clearinghouse of ies.
urpose, I will review the various initiatives launched by the movement, ordered as they The results: what did the movements achieve?
In this final section, I will analyse the successes and failures of the Barzón. For that p have been addressed in the previous section. Altho been attained in almost all the type of actions undertaken.
Inasmuch as they impeded the banks' ability to repossess properties, protests and demonstrations certainly succeeded in protecting the assets m was not officially acknowledged as a partner by the Zedillo Government, 34 and its proposals in favour of collective negotiation, rescheduling, and interest discounts were dismissed, its protests prompted the authorities to create a series of debt relief schemes.
Pressures generated by the movement, by means such as encouraging the spread of defaulting also translated into increased concessions made to the borrowers, especially t the small and medium ones, and in decreased legal actions against them. However, all th deals were made on an individual level, as claimed by the government and the banks.
The first program concerned exclusively the rural sector, and it was launched in March 1994, one month after an important demonstration from the Barzón had taken place. T S were considered insufficient by the borrowers, and did not moderate the NPLs problems the sector. Moreover, the Salinas government also introduced a patronage-type program, PROCAMPO, to regain support in the rural sector.
After the December 1994 crisis, the authorities' first moves consisted of creating a new These last three programs were a success for the authorities, as the percentage of debtors who choose to participate was high: 84 per cent for the mortgage borrowers' scheme per cent for the FINAPE and 63 per cent for the FOPYME (Banco de México 1997).
Finally, in January 1999, a 'Punto Final' program was launched by the banks in order to clean their balances. As the last programs, this relief scheme included important discounts on debt service (estimated between 45 and 60 per cent) and was directed towards SME rural sector and mortgage debtors. Although these programs did not entirely resolve the NPLs problems of the banks-almost seven years later, bad debts still represent a high percentage of aggregate credit-they did resolve the financial troubles of many borrowers.
As a consequence, they clearly contributed in releasing the pressure maintained since 199
35 Discounts varied from 30 to 40 per cent of debt service. The costs of subsidizing interest rates were shared by the government and the banks in the cases of FOPYME and FINAPE; but the costs of the mortgage scheme were supported exclusively by the authorities.
by the debtors' movement on the authorities and on the banks. and 'new' debtors, effectively curtailing the growth of these organisations (Torres 1997a).
As for their broader propositions, very little results are acknowledged, as the econom model has not yet been discussed or modified. 
